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In May 2016, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Microsoft signed the ‘Code of conduct on
countering illegal hate speech online’ with the European Commission. Since then, there has
been a series of three monitoring cycles, during which public authorities and non-
governmental organisations as cooperation partners of the Commission checked, over a
period of several weeks, whether the companies are doing what they agreed to do. One of
their central obligations is that they review the majority of valid notifications for removal of
illegal hate speech in less than 24 hours and remove or disable access to such content, if
necessary. What is deemed illegal is defined by the Framework on Racism and
Xenophobia, a document discussed further down. The last monitoring cycle took place
between November 6th and December 15th 2017 in twenty-seven Member States (except
Luxembourg). The results were comparatively favourable (overall) in comparison with the
previous monitoring cycles. On average, IT companies removed 70% of the prohibited
content, compared with a removal rate of 59% in the second monitoring cycle and 28% in
the first.
On the face of it, this is good news. The European Commission is creating synergies with a
variety of entities to crack down on hate speech, the removal rate of ‘illegal hate speech’ is
rising and, thus, our pursuit (as a democratic society) of ‘cleaning up’ threats to pluralism,
acceptance and solidarity is increasingly becoming efficient. However, it is not as simple as
that. The Code of Conduct, as an initiative of the European Commission, impacts hate
speech on social platforms in the European Union only. So, what about hate speech
elsewhere, or outside social media, or beyond the four IT companies mentioned above, or
even offline? Moreover, if international and European law had worked effectively enough to
guide States (not private IT companies) in the right direction when it comes to hate speech
regulation, would the liaison with private actors really be a necessity? Would watching,
reporting, removing and then checking removals really be considered efficient in
challenging online hate speech?
There is a number of varying thresholds to free speech regulation set out by relevant legal
tools, namely Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Racial Discrimination, Article 20(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the EU’s Framework Decision on Racism and Xenophobia and the Additional
Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention. These variations, discussed below, can do nothing
but confuse countries. Moreover, threshold or no threshold, anti-hate speech legislation
developed on an international and European level has a major flaw, which goes against
principles such as solidarity and equality. More particularly, apart from the justifiable
direction of the ICERD, these frameworks are marred by what I refer to as the hierarchy of
hate, namely the arbitrary focus on particular types of hate speech, such as racist speech,
and the simultaneous disregard for other genres such as homophobic speech.
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International Framework
Article 4, ICERD punishes, amongst others, all dissemination of ideas based on racial
superiority or hatred and incitement to racial discrimination. Article 20(2) of the ICCPR
prohibits (not punishes) any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. So, just on a United Nations level, we
have both a threshold and a penalty discrepancy. Whilst the ICERD punishes the particular
expression by law, the ICCPR simply prohibits it, therefore not necessarily calling on
criminal law as the necessary tool. To confuse the situation more, the prohibited speech
under the ICERD encapsulates a low threshold, including, for example, the dissemination
of ideas based on racial superiority (with no necessity that these ideas constitute or call for
hatred or violence). On the other hand, the ICCPR prohibits the actual advocacy for
discrimination, hatred or violence. It is not, therefore, sufficient, for such speech merely to
disseminate ideas of racial or religious superiority. In fact, the Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression held that ‘the
threshold of the types of expression that would fall under the provisions of Article 20 (2)
should be high and solid.’
On a European level, we have two relevant documents, namely the Framework Decision on
Racism and Xenophobia and the Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention
concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through
computer systems. The first document constitutes the legal Framework of the Code of
Conduct. Article 1.1(a), therein, holds that Member States shall take the measures
necessary to ensure that the following intentional conduct is punishable:
‘publicly inciting to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of
such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic
origin.’
On a Council of Europe level, the Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention tackles
racist and xenophobic material online. The lowest threshold prohibited conduct is the
intentional and „without right“ dissemination of racist and xenophobic material through
computer systems.
So, about thirty years down the line (after the two above UN documents), the most central
European anti-hate speech document (the Framework Decision) heightens the threshold
(we now need to demonstrate that conduct is intentional, that the expression is public and
that it incites violence or hatred (not discrimination as in the case of Article 20(2) ICCPR).
The threshold is further raised by Article 1.2 which holds that Member States may choose
to punish only conduct which may disturb public order or which is threatening, abusive or
insulting. So, if I am a country member of both the UN and the EU, I am definitely receiving
mixed signals from the institutions I am part of as to what kind of expression should in fact
be deemed illegal.
Hierarchy of Hate: An anathema to solidarity, equality and
social justice
The ICERD deals with nothing but racist speech because it is a Convention about racism.
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The ICCPR deals only with national, racial or religiously motivated hate speech but looks at
no other types of prohibited expression such as homophobic or transphobic speech. Why?
I cannot say. Maybe the issue is chronological, protecting sexual minorities was not as high
on the agenda of the international community in the 60s, when the Covenant was drafted,
as it is today. But, what I really cannot find a justification for is the EU’s framework decision
of 2008. Why was the focus only on hate directed against racial, religious, ethnic and
related characteristics? What is the reason for the absolute disregard to other
characteristics targeted by individuals, groups and institutions (particularly those related to
a person’s sexual identity and orientation)? What message is the EU sending with the
choice to ignore the need for protection of these and other structurally and institutionally
marginalised groups?
Intentional or not, the EU has demonstrated that it is only interested in criminalising
particular types of hate speech whilst completely disregarding others. The same can be
said for the Council of Europe, which chose an Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime
Convention to focus only on racist and xenophobic material online. Note that the necessity
of an Additional Protocol arose after the USA disagreed with the incorporation of its content
in the Convention itself due to First Amendment considerations.
To conclude: The European Commission is trying to find ways to tackle hate speech on
social platforms and has come up with the innovative strategy of (i) the Code of Conduct
itself and (ii) the monitoring exercises. However, I fear that, notwithstanding the significance
of these, they are just band aid approaches, and I wouldn’t be surprised if the Commission
knew this but chose to do something rather than nothing at all.
Let us not forget that the removal of hate speech on social networks relies primarily on the
user whilst the frequency of material generated is hard to keep up with. What we need are
concise socio-legal measures on both national and international levels to pull the roots of
hate speech, many of which are nurtured by bad policies and wrong handling of perceived
‘crises.’  However, I am realist enough to see that this is probably a long shot. The least we
could do, though, is to establish a well-rounded approach to regulating hate speech, with
synergy amongst institutions, such as the UN and the EU, and one which eliminates the
hierarchy of hate established to date.
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